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These remarks are headed: Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy. As T. Reed Powell, I believe, said about a
similar title, one should find it possible to stay within its framework.
If the title is roomy, at least it bears a promise of reflection.
The constitutional controversies on which one might reflect include different controversies between different controversialists. There
has, of course, been controversy between Justices of the Supreme
Court. There have been strong words in constitutional clothing by
state legislators and governors and some Southern congressmen against
the Supreme Court, and, unusually, even some words back by the
Court, in Cooper v. Aaron.' And there have been differences rising
perhaps to the level of not-always-polite controversy, among us, the
professors.
Note an omission. At one time, one might have reflected also
on sharp constitutional disagreements between members of Congress.
Such controversy hardly exists today. One reason is that legislators
have apparently discontinued reflecting on the constitutionality of their
* These remarks were prepared for presentation at a round-table meeting of the
Annual Conference of the Association of American Law Schools, in Philadelphia, Pa.,
on December 28, 1960. They appear as delivered with minor emendations and the
addition of footnotes.
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1937, Yeshiva College;
LL.B. 1940, Harvard University.

1358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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own actions. It is a rare occasion when even an isolated member of
Congress manifests that his oath to support the Constitution of the
United States requires that he consider whether or not the Constitution permits particular legislation, or incidental legislative activity. It
is a rare committee of Congress that deems it part of its function in
considering a bill or conducting a hearing to reach a judgment as to
how its actions square with the limitations and obligations of the
Constitution. Even state legislators, some of whom have no hesitation
to challenge constitutional interpretations of the Supreme Court, do
not appear to indulge the more fruitful practice of attending dispassionately, in advance of legislative action, to how this action would
conform to the Constitution as it has become, even-if you will-as the
Supreme Court is likely to make it. One may well reflect a little sadly
on such legislative omissions, and upon their relevance to so-called
presumptions of constitutionality and to the institution of judicial
review.
But this is digression, even if perhaps relevant digression. We
turn to the controversies which are current. We will reflect in particular about controversy within the Supreme Court of the United
States and about controversies of professors about the controversies
of the Justices. We will suggest that there has been a change in the
subject matter of constitutional controversy; that there has been a
corresponding, if not a consequent, change in the issues that divide
the Justices of the Supreme Court; that there has been a change also
in the criticism of the Court, leading to controversies among the
critics.
THE CHANGING ISSUE OF THE CONSTITUTION

We begin by examining the constitutional stuff of which today's
controversies are made; and we approach that examination by noting
yesterday's battlefields which are today quiet. It has long been
apparent that the constitutional provisions in controversy today are
not those of a generation ago, specifically the judicial generation which
passed in 1936. Principally, the extent of the power of Congress is
hardly in question. The once-big issue, the scope of permissible action
by Congress in matters affecting interstate commerce, is no Linger an
issue. "To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states" has gone as far as words will go, and relation or relevance to commerce has been stretched-or recognized-where it never
had been before. If the commerce power were not enough, other
powers have magnified to render it highly unlikely that any foreseeable
congressional act would be declared to fall outside the Constitution's
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authorizations to Congress. Congress long ago learned that it can
tax anything, and can prohibit or regulate by taxing-apparently even
if regulation is the principal motive.2 Permissible congressional action
under the fourteenth amendment has grown, as the concept of "state
action" and state responsibility has grown, maybe even to include
forms of state inaction. The so-called war powers and their ramifications during war, and in the aftermath of war, and in anticipation of
war, or in the fear of war, or in defense against possible war, have led
some to wonder whether there is anything beyond the scope of that
power of Congress. And the newly labeled "foreign affairs power"
of Congress has led at least me to wonder whether Congress might not
be able to legislate on anything which affects the relations of the
United States with other nations, in a world in which everything
seems to affect in some way the relations of the United States with
other nations.'
There has, then, been no controversy worthy of that characterization about the scope of the powers of Congress-not even at the height
of the Bricker episode, when "states-righters" found themselves building up the powers of Congress in order to show that cutting down the
treaty power to the size of the powers of Congress could not have any
serious consequence, while lawyers of a generally "nationalist" hue
found themselves denigrating the powers of Congress in order to show
the danger of the proposed constitutional amendment. The Bricker
controversy, it is true, reflected as well as enhanced states-rights sentiment, which has had important effect on whether, and how, Congress
will exercise its powers. But these are political limitations, not constitutional ones; they are self-imposed, not clamped upon an unwilling
Congress by a superior Supreme Court.
As to the states, too, the area of controversy has changed. Some
of the old battlefields are almost quiet. It is true that in regard to
some old issues majorities, over strong dissent, have recently upheld
the power of states to tax net income from interstate commerce,4 as
well as the states' power to tax some instrumentalities having relation
to the federal government.5 But in both areas, it seems clear, this
power can be nullified by Congress. And in both areas the majority of
the Court may have acted on the basis that "it's only money" and may
have assumed that Congress concurs in allowing the states the in2
See, e.g., United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) ; Sonzinsky v. United
States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
3
Henldn, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and
Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 903, 922-30 (1959).
4 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).

5 United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
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creased revenue, even where the United States Government ultimately
pays the bill. There may well remain small questions as to the power
of the states to act when Congress is silent, or speaks unclearly. But
in matters relevant to the nation-and increasingly few matters are
not-the states, in an ultimate sense, act only by the grace of Congress.
The constitutional issues involving the powers of the state, then,
revolve not about the tenth amendment, but about the fourteenth; they
relate not to the issues of federation, but to the relation of the state
to the citizen, of the state's power of government to the individual's
liberties. Here too there has been change. The big issue of the last
generation was "substantive due process," implementing inherent
limitations on government, on the police power. The revolution
brought by Nebbia and Parrish in effect rendered the police power
plenary.' Laissez faire is not a constitutional requirement and the
welfare state is equally consistent with constitutional principles. There
are no inherent limitations on the role of government. There are
only prohibitions, prohibitions like those in the Bill of Rights for the
protection of individuals and minorities. In regard to the states, only
those in the original Constitution are particularized; others can only
be spun out of "equal protection" and the oracular ambiguity of "due
process of law." In economic matters, there remains a minimum of
limitation in substantive due process, a prohibition of confiscation,
and-perhaps-of regulation wholly arbitrary and capricious. But no
recent case has invalidated economic or social legislation for violation
of due process. If the equal protection clause was used-some think
misused-in one case to strike down an economic regulation,7 it is not
likely that there will be many such occasions for the Court to find
objectionable "discrimination" or class legislation.
The constitutional issues today, then, are no longer primarily
about the scope of governmental power, federal or state, but about the
meaning and scope of prohibitions on that power. For the federal
government the issues are about the meaning and application of prohibitions on ex post facto laws and bills of attainder; of "Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech"; of "unreasonable
searches and seizures"; of being "twice put in jeopardy," and being
"compelled to be a witness against himself"; of "due process of law,"
and whether private property was "taken for public use"; of "cruel
and unusual punishments." There are differences about whether to
infer further prohibitions-for example, whether Congress is forbidden
6 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) ; West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,

300 U.S.
379 (1937).
7
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
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to take away a man's citizenship against his will. Even when Justices
seem to be disagreeing about the scope of the power of Congress to
make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces, it is only in a context where the disagreement is really as to
whether civilians associated with the armed services abroad can be
tried without the protections which the Bill of Rights grants to those
accused of crime by the United States.'
Similar controversy is engendered by challenges to actions of the
states. There are the same disputes as to the meaning of specific prohibitions on the states-bills of attainder, ex post facto laws. And still
alive is an old controversy-in its contemporary manifestation exemplified by Adamson v. California9 -whether the Bill of Rights was
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Adamson
in 1947 represented the high water mark for the dissident view, when
four Justices expressed themselves for total "incorporation," although
they differed among themselves as to whether the due process clause
should have some additional independent content. Today only Mr.
Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas frankly adhere to this view.1 0
For the majority, following a series of cases culminating in Palko v.
1 the due process clause forbids to the states action which
Connecticut,"
8

Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) ; Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
910332 U.S. 46 (1947).
Because it is recent, and perhaps insufficiently noted, a new footnote to this
controversy is worthy of mention. Mr. Justice Brennan, at the end of the last term
of Court, apparently decided to seize a case in which Mr. Justice Stewart was not
sitting, Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960), to set forth what Justice
Stewart meant in a majority opinion handed down the same day, Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The view he announced was that where due process
is deemed to afford a protection which is also contained in the Bill of Rights, the
protection against the state has the same scope as the protection against Congress.
For this position one may cite language in earlier cases which seemed to put the
question as whether a particular provision in the Bill of Rights was incorporated
in the due process clause. If so, says Justice Brennan, those provisions which are
found to be incorporated must mean the same thing in their incorporated form
against the states as they do in the Bill of Rights against the federal government.
Justice Brennan admits that there are cases which would not be consistent with his
interpretation, but he considers them erroneous. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, chief
spokesman today for the traditional view of due process, would not agree. In
addition to a number of holdings, he would say, the logic of the doctrine and its
derivation in the language of the fourteenth amendment do not support Justice
Brennan's view. If the due process clause accords some of the protections also
accorded by the Bill of Rights, surely it is not because the framers of that amendment had made a selection among the Bill of Rights for application to the states, but
because the amendment contains a concept, applicable to the states, some of the
content of which coincides with some of the protection in the Bill of Rights. It is
difficult to see why in regard to any particular "right" the concept of ordered liberty
must be found to afford exactly the same protection as has been found in the explicit
language of the earlier amendments. It is yet to be seen whether Justice Stewart
will adopt what four of his brethren say he means; if he does, there will be new
constitutional jurisprudence, another heap of rejected cases, including the renowned
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and a sharp reduction of the differences between
the prohibitions on the federal government in the Bill of Rights, and those on the
states in the fourteenth amendment.
"1302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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"shocks the conscience of Mankind," which violates "the concept of
ordered liberty."

12

So the controversy has raged about this "ordered liberty." Is
ordered liberty violated by involuntary blood tests for alcohol; by
putting Willie Francis into the electric chair a second time after an
abortive first attempt to electrocute him; by failure to provide counsel
to indigents in noncapital cases; by admitting evidence obtained by
unreasonable search and seizure; by trying Hoag for the robbery of
one victim after he had been acquitted of robbery upon other alleged
victims in the same incident? 13
We do not consider any of the disputes in detail. But patterns
are discernible and some generalizations have some warrant. Several
Justices, in most instances a minority, seek to broaden the various
prohibitions against the federal government; and the same Justices,
for the most part, seek to extend the requirements of ordered liberty
to approximate the expanding specifics of the Bill of Rights. They
would find bills of attainder and ex post facto laws in situations where
historically, others insist, the prohibitions would not apply. 4 They
would extend the concept of "punishments" to consequences other than
those meted out by judicial sentence after criminal trial and find some
of these to be cruel or unusual. 5 They would extend the right of the
people to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure to a right
to be secure against inspections by officials who are not police officials
12 One might note that "substantive" rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
are, in the view of all the justices, also protected by the fourteenth amendment,
while the "procedural" safeguards are, for the majority, guaranteed only if they are
implied in the concept of "ordered liberty." If one accepts these categories, there may
still be doubt whether this nice division is coincidence, or an understandable consequence of the spirit and the language of the fourteenth amendment. It has never
been quite clear how the Court was reading and applying the language of the due
process clause. When the Court says that this clause requires of the states that
they respect "ordered liberty," is that requirement found in the word "liberty," in
the phrase "due process of law," or, somehow, in the clause as a whole? When
the Court holds that the clause protects, against state infringement, the freedoms
of the first amendment, is it saying that freedom of speech is an aspect of "ordered
liberty," just as is the right not to be convicted of a crime on the basis of a coerced
confession? One might have suggested that the "substantive" provisions of the Bill
of Rights, e.g., the freedoms of the first amendment, or the right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure, are included in the "liberty" which, together with
life and property, are the subjects of protection. As to the procedural safeguards in
the later amendments of the Bill of Rights, or other procedures not mentioned in the
Bill of Rights, the question for the Court is whether a particular procedure is
implied in "due process," in accepted notions of fairness, in "ordered liberty." It has
sometimes seemed that such careful "parsing" of the clause in the fourteenth amendment might lead to greater consistency, or at least greater clarity. The opinions
of the Court, however, do not fit comfortably into this linguistic analysis.
IsBreithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942); Wolf v.
338 U.S. 25 (1949); Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
Colorado,
14
See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); cf. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
15 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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searching for contraband or evidence of crime.' 6 They would extend
the right to counsel to investigations which are not strictly criminal in
nature." They would extend to new situations the prohibition against
double jeopardy.' 8 Most significant perhaps they would push the
protections of the first amendment-freedom of communication, association, religion, which are also protected by the fourteenth-to a
preferred position, sometimes tantamount to erecting a presumption
of unconstitutionality for legislation on these subjects."
Mr. Justice
Black, and perhaps Mr. Justice Douglas, would seem ready to go yet
further-to the position that communication and association are absolutely immune to regulation, leaving at least libel and the well-worn
"shouting fire in a theatre" somehow to fend for themselves.20
Those who seek to increase the limitations on both federal and state
governments also seek, to that end, to discard some distinctions based
on the separate sovereignty of the states. They seem prepared, for
instance, to find double jeopardy when one is tried by both a state and
the federal government, where the same act violates both state and
federal law.2 ' They are not satisfied that the federal privilege against
self-incrimination does not exempt one from testifying in federal proceedings to matters which may incriminate under state law, nor from
testifying in state proceedings to matters which may incriminate under
federal law. 2 They have barred the admission in federal courts of
evidence unlawfully obtained by state officials.2
Institutional Concomitants of Constitutional Change
The accent on controversy may perhaps divert attention from the
fact that these differences, while sharp and sometimes deep, are in an
agreed and limited area of conflict; outside this area is a large domain
of constitutional development which is settled beyond present dispute.
10

See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
.7See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
18
See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184 (1957) ; cf. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
19 The cases are many, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) ; Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
2
0 See, e.g., their opinion in the obscenity cases, Roth v. Uiited States, 354 U.S.
476, 508 (1957), and in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952). Compare
their respective opinions in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579, 581 (1951).
21
See Abbite v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959).
22
See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Feldman v. United States,
322 U.S. 487 (1944); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
23See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); cf. Rea v. United States,
350 U.S. 214 (1956).
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Although the Bill of Rights is 170 years old, it was little invoked
and infrequently given effect in constitutional litigation before the last
three or four decades. It is interesting to speculate whether this was
because a Congress fighting for its still-limited powers was careful not
to trench on the rights of individuals whom the still-powerful states
would have championed; because in the context of the times the limited
powers of Congress did not in fact produce legislation in the forbidden
areas of the early amendments, or proliferate criminal prosecutions
with which so much of the Bill of Rights is concerned; or because, quite
differently, the Bill of Rights as then interpreted represented a standard
commonly recognized, and one which the Congress was not disposed
to violate. In regard to the first amendment, in particular, it took
foreign war and fear of foreign sympathies to move Congress to impinge on political rights, and after the alien and sedition laws in John
Adams' administration there were none of that kind until the First
World War.
The Bill of Rights, it will be recalled, was an attempt to preserve
for the citizen protections only recently won in England, and some
not then yet won there but achieved in the Colonies. In addition, the
due process clause, innocent in its simplicity, was to assure that there
would be rule of law, the law of the land, the common law and procedure of England. The Bill of Rights offered these assurances against
the central government; similar guarantees against the states were put
into state constitutions.
The fourteenth amendment is eighty years younger than the Bill
of Rights. It has its independent history and its different origins in
a victory for the nation over the states. There is significance in the
fact that, like the Bill of Rights, the fourteenth amendment was not
important for the protection of civil rights or liberties until a few
decades ago-substantive due process to protect liberty born as substantive due process to protect property was dying. New doctrines
and changing world forces led to the increased exercise of repressive
governmental power by the nation and by the states, raising issues
of individual liberty against both governments. And inevitably-if not
necessarily in accord with constitutional language, or history, or logichow the Bill of Rights governed the federal government has affected
how the fourteenth amendment governed the states. In regard to
both the federal government and the states, the protections for the
individual have grown steadily. The Bill of Rights being long established and in comparatively explicit terms, there was of course a
considerable headstart against the federal government, and there was
no states-rights' sentiment to hinder the Court in developing and ex-
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tending protections. Prohibitions on the states, virtually nonexistent
before the Civil War, had to await the slow pouring of content into
ambiguous phrases, in the face of resistance by local interests to a federal Supreme Court applying a not-popular constitutional amendment.
But the long evolution of our common-law constitution continues and
the controversies noted are part of the process. The protections of the
Bill of Rights grow; those of the fourteenth amendment grow too;
they remain less, although the differences are narrowing. The developing concept of ordered liberty reduces the consequences of the
failure of the Constitution to make all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights applicable to the states. Due process, the phrase once designed
to assure mere lawfulness by government, has become the headstone
of the corner of individual protection.
The changing issues of constitutional controversy, then, are yet
another reflection of the fact that the Constitution under which we
live today has changed from that of our fathers. They reflect also, I
would suggest, significant change in the role of the institutions of our
federal government. I offer for your consideration some generalizations, valid, I think, as indicating trends, tendencies, emphases.
Constitutionally,our federal government continues to become a national
government.
In regard to the central government, one may say, with only a
modicum of exaggeration and simplification, that the United States
has become a national society with a national economy, its interests
thoroughly intertwined with those of other nations, particularly in time
of international crisis; that legislatively, at least, the federal government has become a national government; that the power of Congress
has moved from a limited power derived from enumerated clauses
measured out by the Supreme Court, towards a plenary power based
on national need as seen in the light of political judgment. It is the
Congress, no longer the Supreme Court, that ultimately can make the
important decisions of federalism. Once the Court, although itself a
branch of the federal government, stood between the Congress and the
states as an impartial arbiter, meting out to each its proper share of
governmental power. Congress no longer needs the Court to protect
the nation against encroachment by the states; the states can no longer
invoke the Court to protect them against encroachment by Congress.
State and local interests must look for their protection to the Congress
itself, as, indeed, the Constitution originally contemplated-particularly to that body of "ambassadors" of the states, the United States
Senate.
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The Supreme Court is no longer defining and adjusting the frontiers
between the powers of governments; it is defining and redefining prohibitions on government on behalf of the individual.
The issues for the Court are no longer which government, state
or federal, can act, or whether a particular act is within the power of
government. The issue is whether a particular act is prohibited to
government by the Bill of Rights or the fourteenth amendment, or
those other provisions of the Constitution which afford protection to
the individual against the action of his governments. With the exception of the infrequent case reflecting the constitutional separateness
of one state from another, the Court hardly acts any longer to adjust
and maintain the mechanism of federation under the Constitution; it
acts, in constitutional matters, to mediate between the requirements
of government asserted by the Legislature, the Executive, and sometimes the Judiciary, and the protection for the individual and the
minority promised by a written constitution. The Court does not
mediate between two powerful competing interests. It stands in the
path of powerful representative government in the name of an idealthe liberties of the individual.
The constitutional issues before the Court, then, begin to resemble
those of a unitary state with a written constitution. Indeed, one may
suggest that the Court's constitutional role grows less dissimilar to
that of the courts of Great Britain. For when we frequently say,
lightly, that Great Britain has no written constitution, we forget some
very precise constitutional documents like Magna Charta, the Bill
of Rights, the Act of Settlement, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Act of
Toleration, and the Parliament and Representation Acts. Parliament
lives by these. The courts enforce them upon the Executive. If in
principle the courts cannot apply them as limitations on Parliament, we
have seen that in the United States, too, the Court now only rarely
applies our Constitution to limit or prohibit acts of Congress.
In any event, one may fairly suggest that the Supreme Court,
which originally and only yesterday was needed primarily to resolve
the conflicts of federation, is now available-although, and perhaps in
part because, the issues of federalism are evaporating-to assume an
increasing role in the conflict between the alleged requirements of
government and the claimed liberties of the individual.
The Court is not concerned with governmental experiment; it worries
about unfairness to individuals.
When the Supreme Court strikes at governmental action it is
frequently striking at an act of administrators, not at an act of the
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legislature-as in many of the criminal cases under the Bill of Rights
or the fourteenth amendment. If behind such an act of the executive
there is an act of the legislature, it is frequently an old act. If it is a
new act, it is not an act of social experimentation based on hope, but
very likely one of repression rooted in fear-like contemporary internal security legislation. The Court is not now a conservative body
standing athwart new legislative experimentation, economic or social.
It is more frequently a body challenging established institutions. The
Court is engaged in raising state practices, often long established, to
new levels of ordered liberty, or, in federal cases, raising to new levels
the protection against the federal government found in old words in
the Bill of Rights.
When the Court protects the criminally accused, even when it is
struggling with security legislation in the name of political freedom,
it is protecting individuals or small minorities against majority action
deemed unfair; it is not frustrating social and economic programs of
direct moment to large numbers of people. This makes the role of the
Court seem less intrusive. On the other hand, there is less general
sympathy for the Court's work, since insufficient numbers of the
public identify with the rights vindicated. In regard to the states, it is,
of course, not without significance that the enforcement of prohibitions
for the protection of individuals and minorities is administered by a
federal supreme court under a federal constitution. Even there few
constitutional actions of the Supreme Court are calculated to arouse
legislatures thwarted in programs of importance to meet new problems.
The constitutionalissues before the Court relate largely to the states.
The federal government has learned, generally, to meet the explicit standards of the Bill of Rights. It has been more amenable to
reform than some of the now-fifty states. And the Court has been able
to raise federal standards in other ways-through its influence on the
promulgation of rules of procedure, as well as under its supervisory
powers in decisions like McNabb v. United States24 and Rea v. United
States; 25 and Congress has generally acquiesced. There has therefore
been far less need for invoking the Constitution against the federal
government. For years after May 18, 1936,2" not a single act or provision of Congress was invalidated. In 1943 there was Tot v. United
States,2 a minor and isolated instance. Since then, I count five other
24 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
25 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
26

See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
27319 U.S. 463 (1943).
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occasions on which the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of general acts of Congress, four of them in the last six years dealing with or
The civilian-soldier as a permanent
related to the armed forces."
aspect of our society is new; inevitably his constitutional status, and
that of associated civilians, has required clarification, adjustment, and
development.
Because the Court's active constitutional role today is largely directed to curbing the states, and because the Court no longer protects
the states from congressional inroads, the Court is more obviously
and exclusively a branch of the federal government. Because it is
less frequently at odds with Congress-even in the security cases, the
Court has so far avoided declaring any action of Congress invalid, and
one sometimes suspects many in Congress are pleased to have the Court
save them from follies which they deem politically necessary-the Court
may feel more confident to act firmly vis-a-vis the states on behalf of the
federal government, as in bringing up to today's date the meaning
of the Constitution in regard to the Negro. The Court shares with
Congress the role of keeping the states in line, even if there has not been
between Court and Congress any clear division and assumption of
responsibility. In those few constitutional decisions which have broad
impact on the states, the states do not have in the Court a means for
political resistance or self-defense such as they have within Congress
against congressional legislation; nor can the states frequently move
Congress to undo what the Court has done, even where Congress
could constitutionally do so.
The Court increasingly reviews findings of fact.
Increasingly, differences of fact determine whether a constitutional
right was violated. While all constitutional issues may involve matters
of degree, the Court's business under "due process," "equal protection,"
"cruel and unusual" punishments, "unreasonable" searches and seizures, and other constitutional phrases of more or less ambiguity, requires it to determine anew in every case whether the inevitably different facts of this case exceed the forbidden degree. Occasionally,
some Justices, at least, appear to be on the verge of testing, under due
28 See United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86 (1958); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11 (1955). I am counting also United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952),
although it is not clear whether the Court invalidated the provision, or merely construed it as not applicable to the defendant. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.
303 (1946), the Court threw out special legislation providing that no part of an
appropriation should be used to pay the salaries of three named individuals. Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), invalidated an act of Congress interpreted as
requiring school segregation in the District of Columbia.
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process of law, the adequacy of evidence to support a verdict or other
conclusion."9 If the Court should yield to this temptation, it could,
of course, render every case a constitutional case for the Court's review.
Is the Court's jurisprudence changing?
One may also ask whether the changing issues of constitutional
adjudication and the changing role of the Court may not be effecting
modifications in the Court's jurisprudence: in its application of the
requirements of case or controversy, and of standing, even of "substantial federal question" properly preserved and presented, and of the
absence of adequate nonfederal ground; in the doctrine of "political
questions"; in the Court's exercise of judicial review, as exemplified in
the so-called "presumption of constitutionality" and the policy of
"judicial self-restraint"; as well as in related practices like the interpretation of statutes to avoid constitutional doubt. One cannot make
many bricks from the few straws available, but one may hazard a
guess that students of a later generation will be taught a jurisprudence
different in these respects from the one we learned.
There are other consequences also for the institution that is the
Supreme Court. It is again the subject of controversy, but for the
most part this is directed at its role in other than constitutional cases
(even when the attacks are motivated by passion aroused by Brown
v. Board of Educ.). ° The periodic efforts to curb its jurisdiction have
been vindictive, and directed at its so-called misinterpretations of statutes or abuse of its supervisory powers, rather than at any alleged
perversion of the Constitution. Problems of racial segregation apart,
the Court's calendar and docket contain few major constitutional cases
having wide community repercussions. There have been legislation and
legislative attempt to undo judicial interpretations of statute; there has
been no occasion to seek constitutional amendment to undo the Court's
constitutional interpretations.
29 Cf. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960); Konigsberg v. State Bar,

353 U.S. 252 (1957).
30347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).

It may seem incredible that one

can speak for half an hour on current constitutional matters and say almost nothing
about Brown v. Board of Educ. My justification is that too much has already been
said; and that our theme is constitutional controversy. The segregation cases have
achieved remarkable unanimity on the Court, and even the critics-those who deal
with the issues rationally-have not engendered much controversy. It is nevertheless
appropriate to note for our purposes that those cases also involve prohibitions on the
states in the name of individual and minority rights; that the cases have important
impact on the states, not on the federal government, and on only some states, not
all; that the Court rather than Congress is acting for the federal government; that
the Court is striking at established patterns in an attempt to raise standards of equal
protection and ordered liberty. And the Negro cases, as much as any other group,
suggest the possibility of changing Supreme' Court jurisprudence, -particularly in
regard to standing, presumptions of constitutionality, respect for state findings of fact,
and "adequate" nonfederal grounds.
-
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The consequences which I have suggested-acceptable, I hope, as
tentative generalizations-may be multiplied, and these consequences
have further consequences. Perhaps we are only stressing the obvious
results of changes in the life of the nation: the Court's constitutional
activity must reflect the change in political relationships between the
federal and state governments, and the consequent changes in their
respective spheres of activity. Where the Court is obviously adopting
revised meanings for the Constitution, as in Brown v. Board of Educ.
or Shelley v. Kraemer,3 it is also reflecting deep change in today's
United States and in the world of which it is a part. It is obvious
that the Supreme Court is not out of this world.
THE CONTROVERSY OF THE PROFESSORS

We will return to the constitutional divisions on the Court today.
I should like to get back to them through some reflections about the
criticism of the Court by its best critics.
Professorial criticism of the Court is hardly new. Professor
Frankfurter, for example, and even more the late Professor T. Reed
Powell, frequently held a mirror to the Justices, although it is not
always apparent that all the Justices looked into it. It has been remarked, again recently by Dean Griswold, that no one has appeared
to pick up Powell's mirror.
Perhaps that was inevitable. Perhaps the professor-critic's role
had to change with the change in the constitutional issues before the
Court, and in the times of the Justices. Professor Powell was the ideal
critic for the comparatively unsophisticated jurisprudence of a comparatively unsophisticated Court majority. He was not demanding
that the Court replace their values with his. He could show the
Justices what assumptions they were finding in the Constitution, often
without being aware that they were making any assumptions. He
could identify the texts of economic interest which lay behind their
pretexts of doctrine. With dispassionate surgical deftness, he could
trace the circles in their reasoning, spear their tautologies, make
blatant their inconsistencies, scorn their distinctions where there were
no differences and their failures to distinguish where there were. He
could mock their juggling of concepts and categories when they should
have been looking hard at hard facts.
If Justices of a former day deserved their chastisement, they
were perhaps also deserving of classic forgiveness, for it is not beyond
doubt that they knew what they did. The Court is more sophisticated
today. Justices are subject less to charges of nalvet6 than of cynicism.
And so the critics they deserve are different-and the criticism. In
a' 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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any event, after a lull while the Court and its jurisprudence were
changing, the professors are again giving attention to the Court. The
professors have been virtually unanimous in defense of the Court
against the passionate outbursts of those gored by Brown v. Board of
Educ. They were only less than unanimous when others, perhaps also
motivated by anger over school integration, made other irresponsible
attacks, especially when these took the form of attempts to limit the
jurisdiction of the Court by congressional legislation. Then the professors criticized in turn. Perhaps because the professors felt obliged
to show that their defense of the Court was not uncritical; perhaps
because they felt that their defense of the Court gave them the right to
criticism of a more responsible character; perhaps because the Court
again cried for criticism-the law schools have begun to play again
the role of loyal critic.
There has been criticism-and defense-of the handling of particular cases-for example, the FELA and Jones Act cases. There
has been criticism of sloppy judicial procedures, of inadequate consideration and unacceptable analysis, of opinions that are enigmatic,
unmeaningful, misleading. From some quarters there has been criticism that the Court, or some members of it, have shamelessly become
too-much a political body, too-little a judicial one; that they have
abused the opportunity of their position to remold this country nearer
to their hearts' desires; that they have legislated more than interstitially, have distorted interpretation into legislation, have given
statutes and legislative materials readings that were not fair readings
-in order to achieve a result in the case before them that conformed
to their political desires, not to those of the legislature. From other
sources has come criticism of another kind-that the Court, or Justices on it, were dragging long chains of the dogmas of the quiet past;
were indifferent or hostile to the demands of individual liberty and
minority rights; were abdicating their constitutional role of checking
oppressive majorities; were retarding the realization of the American
ideal.
These and other criticisms have had their rebuttals. Particularly when the criticism was against one "wing" of the Court, there
were counterattacks against the other, especially by those who see every
Supreme Court Justice alive as either a liberal or a little conservative.
For today's purpose, however, we would eschew most of these controversies and deal only with some that revolve around the Court's role
in constitutional decision.
Perhaps Judge Hand began the current round in his rare incursion into the academic universe. Speaking of judicial review he
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agreed, one might say, that the Court may properly determine the
frontiers of power of Congress or of. the states.82 It should not, however, intrude when the Legislature is acting within the general orbit
of its powers, merely to substitute the Court's choice between values
for the choice of the Legislature. If the generalizations we suggested
earlier about the changing constitutional issues are correct, on Judge
Hand's position, the issues coming before the Court today require
judicial restraint-at least where acts of the Legislature rather than
those of the Executive are concerned.
Then Professor Wechsler demanded of the Court "neutral principles" of adjudication, and looked for them-and had difficulty finding
them-in several leading cases where he sympathized with the result:
3
Brown v. Board of Educ., Shelley v. Kraemer, the Negro voting cases. 3
Professor Pollak sought to help Professor Wechsler find neutral principles for reaching the results in those cases.3 4 Recently, two articles,
one by Professors Mueller and Murray Schwartz, one by Professors
Miller and Howell, questioned the very demand for neutral principles.3 5
Most recent were Dean Griswold's strictures against "result-oriented"
decisions."0
The Call for Principle
Perhaps a word in the controversy must be said as foundation for
the reflections to follow. It seems to me inevitable that we start where
Professor Wechsler starts. His term "neutral principles" has been
variously interpreted, and at least part of the disagreement with him
is due, perhaps, to misunderstanding. But if I interpret him correctly,
it would seem that Professor Wechsler demands what my colleague
Paul Mishkin and I have called, in the title to an article we have never
written, "The Return to Doctrine": Professor Wechsler calls for
principle, generally applied, except where the Constitution is admittedly, or can be interpreted as being, partisan. Surely, to begin with
32

HAND, THE BmL. OF RIGHTS (1958).

33

Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L.

REv.

1

(1959).
34 Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
3
5 Mueller & Schwartz, The Principle of Neutral Principles,7 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
571 (1960) ; Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication,
27 U. CHI. L. Ruv. 661 (1960).
36 Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Hart and Judge
Arnold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARV. L. REV. 81 (1960). The controversy between Professor Hart and once-Professor Thurman Arnold, while not irrelevant, does not turn on different views as to the Court's role in constitutional
adjudication. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court,
1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1959); Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 73
HAxv. L. REv. 1298 (1960).
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the absurd, the Court ought not to decide for appellant against respondent, in constitutional cases as in others, because appellant has
bribed the Court, or is a political leader, or is a nice fellow-unless
judgment for the payer of bribes, or the political leader, or the nice
fellow, were to be accepted as a general principle of adjudication.
Surely decision should not go in a specific case, nor should special
constitutional preference be given, to the rich man, or the white man,
or the protestant man, or the poor man, or the insurance company, or
the labor union, or the black man, or the Quaker, or the Witnessunless one can fairly say that the Constitution granted such a preference. Neutral principle, then, means, I take it, "principle," "doctrine," a rule of general application. Neutral principle also means that
the principles which the Court announces must be logically and consistently applied. It means, for example, that if the due process clause
no longer precludes economic regulation and does not prevent a state
from barring "yellow-dog contracts," it does not prevent a state from
adopting a "right to work" law, unless relevant differences can afford
a distinguishing principle. 37 It means that if a state can require the
Ku Klux Klan to disclose its membership, a state can be barred from
requiring membership lists from the NAACP only if the Court can
set forth relevant distinctions between the two cases. 88 It means, on
the other hand, Professor Wechsler might rightly say, that one cannot continue to nod respect to language and history and admit that
the fourteenth amendment applies only to state action, but go on to
treat private action as state action when it is a Negro complaining.
Or, again, one cannot find judicial enforcement of racial discrimination to be forbidden state action in one circumstance, and not in another, unless one can build a rational distinction between the two kinds
and contexts of judicial action that is relevant to the concept of state
action.
It happens that I, like Professor Pollak, believe that the particular
cases which bother Professor Wechsler can be justified on "neutral
principles," although the Court perhaps did not do so effectively. But
Professor Wechsler's basic thesis seems to me unchallengeable. It is
a thesis which should perhaps go without saying, but one cannot assert
confidently that it does not need to be said. One cannot be sure that
the object of his attack is a man of straw, as long as courts continue
to give basis for his fears, and writers even seek to rationalize a principle of "anti-principle." Professor Wechsler's seems to me to be the
3 See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.

(1949).
525 38
See Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928) ; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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inevitable reaction, long overdue. Long ago critics of the Court began
"to remove the fig leaf," to stress that judges were fallible mortals with
prejudices, who talked "principle" that was really a rationalization
for achieving prejudged results; or, at least, that judges tended to find
in the general language of the Constitution the notions they brought
to it about the proper role of government and the rights of the individual. It was perhaps inevitable that some should carelessly press
this necessary cautionary reminder to the judgment that there is, can
be, and ought to be no doctrine, that all adjudication is empirical,
ad hoc, and that the appellate judge, at least in constitutional cases,
has no rule other than his own predilections. But is it not time to
insist that this is not so, and that not even the most extremist proponent of the empirical view really intended any such absurdity? Is it
not clear that even strictly political actions of political bodies cannot
be entirely ad hoc, and that the judge's role under a written constitution differs from the politician's at least in substantial degree? Can it
be denied, for instance, that every Justice has at some time decided a
constitutional case contrary to his political sympathies, although judges
may differ radically in how hard they will struggle to achieve a disinterested result?
Sometimes, it appears that those who deny doctrine believe that
they are supporting an "activist" view in constitutional adjudication.
But the cases which bother Professor Wechsler in particular were
unanimous decisions, or at least decisions which did not reflect any
basic "activist" division in the Court, and which quickly became accepted by all. The current divisions of the Court, to which we have
referred, are not differences as to whether principles exist, or whether
they should be neutral or general. All members of the Court assume
that there is doctrine and act on that assumption. All participate in
the writing of opinions, the citation of cases, even the distinguishing
of other cases; do these not presuppose a rational application of principle by a continuing judicial institution? If there is any among
today's Justices who rejects doctrine, he pays to the rest the homage
of hypocrisy by joining in the rational process of adjudication on the
assumption that principles exist. In large areas of the Constitution
today judges do not even differ as to what the principles are-as in
those once-issues in which the Court has long denied review and litigants no longer seek it. Where the judges now divide they are differing not as to whether principles exist, but as to what are the applicable
and controlling principles.
The denial of principle is, I sometimes think, the snicker of the
cynic. To him the entire process of decision is a sham. The judicial
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opinion is ritual, not reason, and principles are incantations to be invoked. To those who believe, on the other hand, that the game has
rules and the rules have purpose, that the process has reason, principle
is the essential reason. The judicial opinion is a vital aspect of the
process. One might do worse for the beginning of a definition than
to suggest that judicial doctrine and principle are those reasons for
reaching a result which can be stated in a judicial opinion.
The Ingredients of Constitutional Decision
We assume that there is and must be doctrine, that in the current
divisions of the Court there are, in largest part, doctrinal differences.
Criticism of the work of the Court, then, must deal with these differences, must consider whether competing doctrines are equally acceptable,
and how the proper or preferable doctrine is to be selected.
Sometimes, when discussing one of the Court's constitutional divisions, I amuse myself by asking a student, "Who is right?" Sometimes a wise student rejoins by asking what the question means. Some
would suggest that "Who is right?" is a silly question. They might
say that different judges are applying different values-and there is
no basis, except one's own values, for choosing between the differing
values of different judges.
I might grant them their proposition, within narrow limits. But
even if I were not trying to decide who is right, even if I were only
trying to equip myself to choose between their values, I, as a litigant,
citizen, critic, or legislator seeking constitutional amendment or legislative curbs on the Supreme Court, might wish to know what these
values are. In fact, however, it should be clear that values, and choices
between values, are not fungible, and that not all values are equally
available to the judge. Judges are not entirely at large in choosing
among values. If in some constitutional cases, indeed, either answer
may have something to be said for it, surely we cannot accept that all
constitutional cases can with equal propriety be decided either way.
Like others who have spoken on this subject,3 9 I believe that the
Court owes an obligation to the integrity of the judicial process in
constitutional cases to articulate the bases for its decisions-what ingredients have gone into the judgment, in what weights, absolute and
comparative. The writing of an opinion will help assure that the decision is based on principle, and will help make clear what the
principle is. Whether or not the Court meets this obligation, the
39 Early criticism of inadequate per curiam and other opinions was Professor

Brown's in Foreword: Process of Law, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv.
L. R v. 77 (1958).
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critic of the Court, too, must seek to identify the ingredients of decision,
to expose those which are choices between competing values, to examine the extent to which this choice is open to the judge, to evaluate
the choice made.
I do not suggest that this is an easy task, that it can be done with
any hope of precision, that the process of criticism itself can escape
criticism for the critic's assumptions, articulated or unarticulated, and
the critic's choices. But the attempt is essential if the critics are to be
able to speak to the Court, or to each other. Here I should like to
reflect briefly on what seem to be principal ingredients in constitutional
adjudication, and on how the Court handles them.
Let us begin by stressing the extent to which the judge, in constitutional adjudication, does not have free choice between values or
results. There are some elements in decision, that may also be called
principles or values, which, all must agree, limit the judge's choice.
Take, for instance, the very fact of a written Constitution, and the
kinds of substantive provisions in our Constitution. A judge is inevitably bound by the system of government which is the context in
which he sits. We may demand of him commitment to the philosophy
of government that he, in his part, also represents. The fact that the
Constitution which he invokes is written means that he must pay a
substantial respect to the words in it, no matter how much he may
feel that the society would be better if they had not been written, or if
different words were in the Constitution. If language can be used at
all, there must be large areas of agreement on the meaning of words.
Words are ambiguous but the area of ambiguity is not without narrow
limits; in many provisions, at least, the words of the Constitution
have a minimum core of unambiguity which cannot be avoided. Surely,
then, the Court does not have unlimited latitude to say what the Constitution is; the Court does not possess an equivalent alternative to the
amending process provided in the Constitution. Words limit the
choices open to the Court. We can demand that Justices give words
their due.
There are other institutional factors, or principles, or values,
which also limit the Court's freedom in choosing among values. The
fact that it is established as, and called, a "judicial body," not an
itappellate legislature," suggests that its choice between values is not
as free as was that of the legislature whose action it reviews. We do
not pretend to define the difference in role between judiciary and legislature, or to define even the special differences between these roles
in constitutional cases-in distinction from their roles in the development of private law. But surely there must be more to justify a court
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in invalidating a statute than that the judge, had he been in the legislature, would have voted for value B as more desirable than value A.
These factors-the written Constitution, the unambiguous minimum
core of meaning in its words, the quality of a court in contradistinction to a legislature-will be generally accepted, I believe, as limitations
on the Court's free choice between values, although there may be disagreement as to how stringent the limitations are, in general or in a
particular case. There are other ingredients, with greater uncertainty
as to their import, and greater disagreement as to how heavily they
weigh. There are words between the lines of the Constitution, and
the history of these lines and of these words, the story of what was
said about them by those who said and heard them. There is "the
statute as a whole," the pattern of the Constitution, the division of
power between nation and state, the distribution of functions among
the branches of the national government, and the limitations on these
powers. In addition to the pattern as established, there is the pattern
that became, the federalism that grew and the special shape it took as
the result of the Civil War, and the Civil War amendments, and the
interpretations of these amendments. There are the great admonitions
-of Marshall, that it is a constitution we are expounding; of Holmes,
that in interpreting the Constitution we must consider what this country
has become. That it is a constitution suggests that it is alive and
grows; it suggests also that there are principles of growth; it does not,
of course, mean that any Justice is free to make it "grow" however
and wherever he will.
We have been recently reminded that our ancestors did not expel
George III in order to offer an American throne to Clio, the Muse of
History.4" We may all agree that they did not. But do we, perhaps,
owe more and better to history than did our ancestors? Or perhaps,
not being revolutionaries, can we as easily escape history? That it is
a constitution we are expounding also means that our ancestors wrote
the document for us as well as for themselves. We are not new men,
without umbilical cord. To be aware of how we got here does not mean
to be tied by the dogmas of the past. The rearview mirror is not
primarily to warn us that we are being chased. It suggests, it has
been said, that you cannot successfully navigate the future unless you
keep always framed beside it a small, clear image of the past. Clio
deserves no throne; but may she not claim a corner seat at the conference table?
The ingredients we have mentioned are admittedly proper, even
if the weights to be given them are hardly agreed by either Justices
40 Calm, Book Review, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 16, 1960, p. 8, col. 3.

658

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.109:637

or critics. Even these disagreements, I would urge, are within limits
which emphasize that the Justices are not at large in their choices.
There are, however, ingredients of another kind, more difficult to appraise and to criticize. Sometimes it is clear that what determines
how the agreed ingredients we have noted are used-what determines,
ultimately, the decision-are other ingredients whose claim to inclusion is not always articulated and justified. I do not mean anything
sinister like bias to a particular litigant, or even a class of litigants.
I refer to implicit or assumed philosophies of government which Justices find or put in the Constitution.
What one might call meta-constitutional assumptions are not new
to constitutional adjudication, although the need to justify them has
not always been equally felt or satisfied. Way back, for example, in
Calder v. Bull,4 Mr. Justice Chase suggested that there are inherent
limitations on government, apart from the Constitution, deriving from
natural justice. Mr. Justice Marshall, too, in Fletcher v. Peck,42 suggested that even without a constitutional prohibition there are things
a legislature cannot do; for example, it could not take private property
without compensation. Later Justices were less frank, or perhaps less
aware. When Justice Holmes said in dissent in Lochner v. New
York 43 that the fourteenth amendment did not enact Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics, it is not beyond possibility that Mr. Justice Peckham
and his majority in that case did not know what Holmes was talking
about.4 4 They could not, perhaps, conceive that one could read the
Constitution without finding there, or assuming, that particular view
of the role of government which accorded with their ideas of the natural
and inevitable. Important deviations from laissez faire were violations
of the natural limitations upon government which, if they did not rise
to constitutional stature before, were put or confirmed there by the
fourteenth amendment.
Lochner v. New York and its assumed limitations on government
are long dead. But there are now prohibitions on governmental action
which Justices have found in the Constitution, also subject to the charge
that the Justices are putting them there. We are all agreed that the
fourteenth amendment did not enact Herbert Spencer or Adam Smith,
413

U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).

42 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).

43 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905).
44 A friend once asked Mr. Justice Holmes: "What about your colleague, Justice
Peckham?" "Oh," answered Holmes, "he is a handsome, charming fellow and a
delightful raconteur." "I don't mean that," continued his questioner, "I mean what
is he like intellectually speaking?" "Intellectually?" replied Holmes. "I never thought
of him in that connection.
"Now that you ask me, however, I would say that his major premise is 'God
damn it!"

1961]

CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY

the "liberalism" of another day, as limitations on majority government; many of us seem prepared to assume that the Constitution did
enact John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. The Court has found, or put,
ideas of proper relation between individual liberty and governmental
order in the first amendment and in the fourteenth. If the language
of the first amendment offers more of a "peg" for Mill than, to our
trained eye, the words "liberty or property" provide for Herbert
Spencer or Adam Smith, one must admit that the language cannot
bear the whole weight, even as to the federal government, even less as
to the states. And, though we give every weight to the ancestral influence of John Locke and to the later Jefferson, history too does not
provide the necessary support.45 The views of Mill afford a philosophy
of government which you and I may share, but it is likely that this
philosophy was not shared by those who wrote either of those amendments, and is not shared by the majority of the citizenry today, surely
not by majorities of the legislatures which pass acts which the Court
invalidates in the name of these amendments. When the Court gives
these protections a preferred position and, assuming a different role
for the Supreme Court in relation to legislation, applies a different
presumption as to the constitutionality of legislative action, the Court
may also be doing something with which you and I sympathize. But
it is important that the Justices, and the professors, admit it and justify
it. There have of course been attempts at justifications-in Stone's
famous footnote; " in Cardozo's "matrix" metaphor; " even Judge
Hand's strictures on judicial review admit that here it is less likely
that the legislature has balanced values impartially and in good judgment.48 But granting some justification for "preferred position," the
nature and degree of the preference remain to be agreed. Somewhere,
some Justices at least seem to see an ideal image of the nation, of the
"democracy" which we are not but are ever becoming; and they see
theirs as the principal role in realizing that image. Perhaps the Court
cannot even attempt to educate us as to what is the ideal image of
ourselves as a nation, what is this "democracy" toward which our
Constitution is being headed. The critic may still demand such education; he may also demand that the Court keep in mind that democracy implies respect for majorities as well; he may ask whether the
Court is the one to lead the reluctant rest to that promised democracy.
The critic is entitled to ask, although he be himself hard put to give
45 See LEvy, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 100-04, 266-67, 299-306 (1960),
mipra note 36.
46 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
47
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937).
48
HAND, THE Bn.L oF RIGHTS 69 (1958).

Calm,
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a confident answer, how much this ideal of freedom is to weigh in a
balance with language, or history, or the respect due to legislatures,
or the respect due to federalism when action of a state is involved.
The Process of ConstitutionalAdjudication
The choice of values in today's divisions then can be criticizedon the ground of insufficient respect to institutional limitations; too
little or too much weight to other factors admittedly relevant; the injection of factors not admitted, the degree of their influence not justified; a preference by some Justices for results which fit an image of
the nation not projected by the Constitution and which the Justices
cannot prove to be justified by history, need, the philosophy of the
people, or anything other than the Justices' faith or inclination. The
criticism is not to be directed at any one judge, or even exclusively at
one faction. Inevitably, of course, the burden of justification is greater
-if indeed justification is inherently possible-when a Justice allows
his ideal to outweigh the traditional ingredients of adjudication.
These criticisms, of course, assume adjudication on principle,
the kind of general principle which I believe Professor Wechsler demands. There is another respect, however, in which the current divisions may be examined, and some of the Justices found wanting, in
respects which do not meet Professor Wechsler's demands. For the
demands of doctrine we have suggested also require respect for the
qualities of principled adjudication, for the integrity of judicial process.
The law, if we may adapt Cardozo, is "not only as the past has shaped
it in judgments already rendered, but as the future ought to shape it in
cases yet to come." 4 The judge, as Cardozo said of the lawyer, "must
be historian and prophet all in one." 'o We have suggested that the
claims of history-where we started, how we came, what we have
become-are not always given their due in the development of constitutional doctrine. If the Court has not always been fair to its role
as historian, it is sometimes even less fair to its role as prophet. For
that should suggest that a decision is to live for some indefinite while,
that a doctrine is to have some durable life and have application to
other cases of common character. Neutral principles need not be
eternal, but they ought to offer hope for survival. If lines are to be
drawn, we may have to accept that there may be two cases, barely
on either side of a fine line, with opposite results. We may have
to accept also that in the light of experience and hindsight, the Court
may later see fit to redraw the line. But still its decisions must draw
49 CARDoZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 137

5o Id. at 166.

(1931).

19611

CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY

a line, must establish a principle of decision to which the Court is
then prepared to give general application. It is obvious, of course, that
the Court only decides the case before it, but in deciding that case it
must give reason that promises applicability to the next case. Too
often, it is fair to say, the Court, intent on disposing of the case before
it, has inadequately considered that the reasons it gives, and the doctrine it announces, will and ought to apply to tomorrow's case in indistinguishable circumstances. No doubt some of the Court's critics
read more into judicial opinions than is there, and are later surprised
when the Court tells us that its earlier decision was limited. Still,
greater awareness by the Justices, greater care in giving reasons for
decision, would have spared it criticism when the Court moved from
Dennis to Yates, from Watkins back to Barenblatt, from Nelson and
Sweezy to Uphaus.5"
But the criticism reaches deeper. Can the Court announce, in
Lambert v. California," that ignorance of the law is a constitutional
excuse, without writing an opinion which would adequately distinguish
ignorance which has been held not to be an excuse, and give due
account to the generally applied view that scienter is not a constitutional requirement? Or take Shelley v. Kraemer, a case that concerned Professor Wechsler and has troubled others. The Court announced, as the basis for decision to reverse enforcement by a state
court of a restrictive covenant, that judicial action is state action. That
some judicial action is state action was long clear, for example, from
state criminal convictions invalidated for lack of procedural due process.
But some believe that the Court was invalidating as "state action"
discrimination which was not the state's but that of private individuals.
They believe also that there is some judicial action that enforces
private discrimination which the Court would not be prepared to invalidate. Is the Court prepared, for example, to find forbidden "state
action" when a state court imposes a sentence, or grants a recovery,
for trespass, to give effect to private racial discrimination? Or when a
state court probates and administers a discriminatory will? If, as
many assume, the Court is not prepared to invalidate the judgments of
state courts in these situations, surely then the reason for the decision
in Shelley v. Kraemer cannot be merely that judicial action is state
action. I, too, suspect that the Court is not prepared to follow where
its opinion might seem to lead. I believe that one can perhaps write
51 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) ; Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) ;
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 239 (1957); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72
(1959).
52355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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an opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer which can draw distinctions that
would tolerate the action of a state giving effect to discriminatory
bequests but not to restrictive covenants; or distinctions that in special
contexts might tolerate the enforcement of religious discrimination,
but recognize no comparable and permissible racial discrimination; or
distinctions that would recognize the state's right to give effect to social
discrimination in one's home, but not in one's business-and show
the relevance of these distinctions to the proper role of government and
thereby to the concept of "state action." Perhaps I am wrong, perhaps
such an opinion cannot be written-at least not without establishing
some new "inherent" concepts about the respective areas of permissible
government regulation and of inviolable individual liberty. The Court
clearly has not written a satisfying opinion. It leaves the impression
that the Court is expanding and contracting words; it does not reflect
adequate recognition that the requirement of "state action" contains
important principles of relation in the federal system, and important
principles of relation between government and individual. Inadequate
efforts to write adequate opinions cry for criticism, not least because
they lend support to the cynics to purvey the impression that reason
is unnecessary, that opinions have to be indulged but do not really
matter.
CONCLUSION

The issues in constitutional controversy today do not generally
reflect an ordeal of battle between powerful political forces. They
represent primarily the degree to which the Court will opt for liberty
over "democracy," will champion an ideal-the rights and liberties of
individuals and small groups-against the forces of representative
government. The changing issues have reflected and effected changes
in institutions and relations between them, changes between state and
nation, between Court and legislature, between Court and critic.
The answers to constitutional questions do not lend themselves
readily to the judgment of right and wrong. We can only hope and
ask for scrupulous adherenge to the process due constitutional adjudication-the principled applitation of principle, man-made principle, the
exposition of the ingredients of decision, of the respective weights given
them, of the choices they represent. Whether or not he likes the
result, the critic must review this process. He too must adhere to
neutral principles, to neutral principles of criticism-he cannot merely
choose sides and vote for his sympathies, or for his judicial favorites.
The critic must demand equally of all judges in all cases respect for
the rules of judging. Perhaps then we can demand for our criticism
and for our own controversies the attention of the Justices.

